The Business of Motorcycle Travel Agencies in the U.S.

Think of a recent Globe and Mail column in which the author argues an Albertine-based pension would provide "capital for Albertan politicians's pet projects," implying the guiding principle of the pension plan would be money for politicians not maximizing risk-adjusted returns for Albertans. The first misleading statement appears in the second paragraph. Still, conversations thus far suggest that any Alberta pension would be guided by similar ideas—that of maximizing returns for participants—that define the CPP.The very following paragraph, which addresses the total value of assets an Albert pension plan would be qualified to withdraw from the CPP fund, makes another perplexing assertion. Although Alberta is "responsible for only 16 percent of contributions," the author claims she wants more than half of the CPP's money. Actually, however, specific legislation controls the withdrawal of any province and the asset distribution calculation, which basically centers on the amount paid into the fund by Albertans plus investment returns (net) less the benefits paid out of the fund and administrative costs. The CPP Act's Section 113(2) makes quite clear that this partition of assets results from that statute.The columnist also ignores the main point of contention in the government's report: Albertans pay far more into the CPP than retirees get due to the province's comparatively younger population—that is, more workers than retirees—and higher average income—that is, higher level of premiums paid into the fund. The study came to the conclusion that even with a contribution rate (i.e., tax) at 5.91 percent instead of the CPP's present base contribution rate of 9.9 percent, Albert workers may get the same benefit from an Albert pension plan as they do from the CPP. For every Albertine employee, that represents savings of about $2,850 year.

The author then shifts to the "bigger is better" case.

claiming without any data "scale allows a larger fund to lower costs." In fact, though it is somewhat large, the CPP is not a low-cost pension scheme. An analysis by former Statistics Canada chief analyst Philip Cross found that the CPP's cost at 1.07 percent of assets was higher than the other examined pension plans, ranging from 0.34 percent at Healthcare of Ontario Pension Plan (HOOPP) to 1.02 percent at the Ontario Public Service Employees Union Pension Trust (OPTrust). The Smith government's research also shows an alternative to keep the Canada Pension Plan Investment Board (CPPIB) as the investment manager should Albert switch to a provincial pension plan. The Globe columnist likewise overlooks this.The author also misstates the relative institution in the province—the Alberta Investment Management Corp (AIMCo). AIMCo has indeed recorded less returns than the CPPIB, but many of the pensions under management by AIMCo have restrictions. AIMCo must modify its investments, for example, if a province pension plan mandates minimum corporate social responsibility or ESG investments on the fund. Conversely, the CPPIB is still mostly motivated by the objective of maximizing returns (risk adjustment).The author's assumption that Alberta's population will look the same as the rest of the nation in thirty years marks a last error. But most analysts and the government's assessment concur that this is a quite conservative presumption. Alberta's more likely future is one in which her younger population will remain more affluent than that of the rest of Canada.

Canadians should deliberately have intelligent. 

discussions on the CPP and possible changes. Canadians, including commentators, have to be informed of the facts if that is to occur. Looking back, the late 1970s and early 1980s were among the worst times the Canadian Armed Forces had to deal with recently. Governments one after another had cut into the military budget, shrinking and reorienting the army while simultaneously postponing modernization. The CF experienced obsolescence in face of major Warsaw Pact developments by the 1980s.While downsizing reduced the military's standing forces, it nonetheless kept a capable administrative apparatus with adequate institutional memory to carry out the new initiatives. By 1990, the military had replaced several of its main systems—such as the CF-18, CP-140, and the Leopard 1—with other major ones including the Halifax Class frigates and the North West Warning system just about ready.Canada currently seems to be in a similar state to the 1980s on the surface, and might even seem to be following the same path should 2017's Strong Secure, Engaged be carried out as intended. Sadly, appearances can fool you. Right now, the reality is significantly worse than it was years before.

Many of the identical systems we obtained. 

in the 1980s are now long beyond their rust-out date and are not expected to be replaced for another decade or more due of failing program execution. Although defense budgets have risen over the previous eight years, rising international commitments have meant that most of them find their way into operational accounting. This has covered the progressively run-down state of the military's capital base.Stated differently, our purchasing mechanism is essentially flawed. Major capability deliveries can now be tallied in decades where years should be the standard. About to start its 17th year of existence without providing a platform, the Remotely Piloted Air System (RPAS) program will provide a medium-altitude unmanned aerial vehicle. Many of our friends, like the United Kingdom, Germany, and France, have brought comparable systems into use in under four years.These mistakes have happened at a bad time as Russia's invasion of Ukraine and China's disruptive actions in the Indo-Pacific have quickly degraded the state of world security. While Canada's efforts have essentially stagnated by contrast, our friends have raised investment and started extensive modernization of their forces.