Canada's Importance in US Trade Policy

The structure of the model is flexed in Box 1; how different vibes of the AEC are included in the model is summed up in the final column of Table 3; and the results of various scenarios are served up in Table 4. The variable reported in this table is like a summary of how much national income gains we get in different situations, based on assumptions about integration policies. The full implementation of the AEC would totally flex real incomes by $69.4 billion, or 5.3 percent of regional GDP over the 2004 baseline—a mad number compared to those usually estimated in FTA studies. This study is like, saying that a big reason for the increase is because of stuff in the AEC that's way more than just AFTA. The effects of the full AEC are like, seven times bigger than the effects of the remaining liberalization under AFTA.

Like, around half of the extra perks come from trade facilita- tion (the diff between AFTA and AFTA+), and half from in- vestment facilitation (the assumed diff between AFTA+ and the AEC).

All ASEAN members would totally gain from the AEC, like it's gonna be lit AF!All ASEAN members would totally benefit from the AEC, with the biggest countries like experiencing the sickest gains ever. The benefits ain't even per capita, fam-

yo levels; like, Cambodia and Singapore, countries at op- posite ends of the ASEAN income spectrum, both be flexin' with mad gains. The perks of the AEC are, like, major, but since ASEAN does like three-quarters of its trade with, and receives four-fifths of its FDI from, nonmember countries, scenarios that also include other Asian homies, the United States, and the EU generate mad gains. FTAs with major homies be straight up doubling the benefits of the AEC to $151 billion, or 11.6 percent of GDP. It's lit! Like, around 50% of the extra perks would be from deals with RCEP homies, and like a little less than 50% from deals with the US and Europe fam. The perks of getting more connected with the outside world are way bigger, like duh, for ASEAN economies that have strong links outside the region (like Malaysia, Thai-land, and Vietnam) and not as big for those that are more focused on the region (like Brunei and Lao PDR). The importance of extra-regional integration effects helps to ex- plain why inward-looking economic integration—a legit goal in Europe cuz of its regional trade intensity—was never a viable option for ASEAN. Although early ASEAN cooperation also emerged when import substitution theories were in vogue, it only produced some basic moves for protected, inward-looking development. 

ASEAN Centrality and the ASEAN-US Economic Relationship, fam

Asia-centered coop, fam. Meanwhile, ASEAN's regional diplo-macy has created a lit network of agreements in Asia and Oceania. Yo, in an effort to flex- Regional integration frameworks can help to flex on and yeet the 'noodle bowl' of existing arrangementsOMG, like this network is gonna be legit AF in leading trade in the region. ASEAN is totally down to make it a real pan-Asian thing with the RCEP. This finna effort will also help to flex on the "noodle bowl" of existing arrangements in order to flex the advantages of larger economic zones. Pan-Asian integration initially popped off with two vibes: an ASEAN-Plus-Three squad (including China, Japan, and South Korea) and an ASEAN-Plus-Six squad (including also

ASEAN Centrality and the ASEAN-US Economic Relationship, y'all! Aussie, NZ, and India, fam). The ASEAN-Plus-Three was like totally launched in 2004, when the economic ministers were like "let's do a feasibility study of a potential East Asia FTA, ya know?" OMG ASEAN was like "let's do an East Asia Summit (EAS) in 2005" and they were like "let's add Australia, New Zealand, and India to the ASEAN-Plus-Three meetings" because they were worried that China was taking over the convo. In 2007, Japan was like, "Yo, let's negotiate and create an FTA based on the EAS, you know? We'll call it the Comprehensive Economic Partnership of East Asia, fam." Although the EAS agreed to peep both frameworks in par- allel in 2009, disagreements between China and Japan prevented major progress. This was hella lucky; an AFTA that was all about looking inward could've totally ended up like the Latin American Free Trade Area, which started in the 60s and totally flopped in the 70s. Instead, the AEC's provisions that support integration into the global economy remain some of the most lit dimensions of the AEC project.

At the 2011 ASEAN Summit, China and Japan were like, "Let's go, fam!" 

They agreed to move forward on both tracks and flexed with some joint working groups to shape the negotiations. OMG, ASEAN was like, "Let's create our own thing, ya know?" And then they came up with this cool template called RCEP at the ASEAN Summit in Novem- ber 2012. So lit! OMG, with negotiations poppin' off, this initiative is like a total flex of ASEAN centrality. But its success will depend on many unknowns, including whether a critical missing piece—a legit agreement among China, Japan, and South Korea—can be concluded within the RCEP framework. OMG, policymakers could totally expect that ASEAN integration would bring in some major gains, but like, not much research has been done on the actual numbers, you know? OMG in this lit study (Petri et al. 2012a), they used a dope general equilibrium model to estimate the vibes of the ASEAN project, talking about both the internal and external integration stuff they're thinking about. The results are like, totally lit, with gains of up to 12 percent to the region's GDP, or like 1-2 percentage points to its GDP growth rate during the whole implementation period. So dope! The model was like, used to estimate the effects of several distinct phas- es of the internal integration project, as well as additional steps for flexing the region's internal efforts through new (or better) agree- ments with countries outside the region. The results show mad gains from each of these steps, fam.